Tor exit list
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See whether your connection — or any address you enter — is recognized as a proxy, VPN, Tor exit or data center address, and exactly which signal gave it away. The same published lists and checks that websites use, with every source and update date shown.
216.73.216.52Amazon.com, Inc. is a hosting or cloud network. Ordinary people do not browse from servers, so detection systems assume a VPN or proxy.
Tor exit list
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VPN provider ranges
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Open-proxy blocklists
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Hosting / cloud ranges
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iCloud Private Relay
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Network type (ASN)
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Device time zone vs address
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Browser languages vs country
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WebRTC address
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DNS resolver network
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Proxy headers
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viaforwardedx-forwarded-forproxy-connectionx-proxy-idclient-ipx-real-ip216.73.216.52x-bluecoat-viax-proxy-user-ipx-forwarded-hostList-based checks only: Tor, VPN and data center ranges, cloud feeds, iCloud Private Relay, open-proxy blocklists and the ASN's network type. Browser-side checks apply only to your own connection.
Your own address is checked when the page loads. The verdict says residential, mobile, business, data center, VPN, proxy, Tor or relay, with a confidence and the reasons. Below it, browser-side checks compare your device's time zone with the address's time zone and look for WebRTC and DNS results that point at another network.
Enter an IPv4 or IPv6 address to run the list-based checks on it: Tor exit list, VPN and data center ranges, cloud provider feeds, iCloud Private Relay, open-proxy blocklists and the ASN's network type. The browser-side checks apply only to your own connection, since we cannot see another device's clock or WebRTC.
No site can see through a proxy; what it can see is the address the traffic arrives from and the context around it. Detection is a set of published lists plus a few consistency checks.
The address belongs to a hosting or cloud network — AWS, Google Cloud, Oracle, DigitalOcean, Linode, Vultr and others publish their ranges, and the X4BNet data center list and the ASN type cover the rest. Ordinary people do not browse from a server, so a hosting address is treated as a proxy or VPN by default.
Commercial VPN providers' exit addresses are collected in public lists (we use X4BNet's VPN list, MIT-licensed, refreshed weekly). A hit is a high-confidence VPN verdict; many smaller providers are not on any list and show up only as data center.
Open proxies that anyone can use end up in abuse databases quickly; several DNS blocklists we query (for example DroneBL) flag them with a specific return code, which we show.
The Tor Project publishes its exit list; we refresh it hourly. A Tor exit is the only verdict that is practically certain. See the Tor check.
On your own connection we compare the browser's reported time zone with the address's time zone, and the languages your browser accepts with the address's country. A Berlin clock on a Dutch address is not proof of anything — people travel — but together with a hosting address it is how most detection systems make up their mind.
The word proxy covers very different things, and detection treats them differently.
A data center proxy runs on a server and is recognized by the hosting range alone. A residential proxy routes traffic through a real home or mobile connection, so the address looks like an ordinary ISP customer; it is only caught by behavior, reputation lists or the mismatch checks above.
An HTTP proxy understands web requests and can add headers that reveal it (Via, X-Forwarded-For); a SOCKS5 proxy forwards any TCP connection without looking inside. Neither carries UDP, which is why WebRTC and some DNS lookups bypass both — see the WebRTC leak test.
In order of likelihood: the address is in a hosting or VPN range (fix: a residential or mobile exit, or a provider not on the lists); the device time zone or language does not match the address (fix: align them); WebRTC or DNS exposes your real network (fix: see the VPN test); the address is on a blocklist because of previous abuse (fix: another server, or delisting if it is yours); or the site uses a commercial reputation service whose data we do not have. The reasons list on this page tells you which of these applies to the lists we can see.
Proxy detection is the set of techniques a website uses to decide whether the address a visitor arrives from is a proxy, VPN or Tor exit rather than the visitor's own connection: range lists, hosting-network detection, blocklists, and consistency checks such as time zone and language. This page runs the same checks and shows the result.
Often, yes. Commercial VPN exits are in published lists and almost always in hosting ranges, so a site that checks either will flag them. What a site cannot see is who you are behind the VPN or what you do through it. Residential or small-provider VPNs are detected far less often.
Open this page through the proxy. The verdict and the reasons show what detection systems see — a hosting range, a VPN list hit, a blocklist entry or a mismatch — and therefore whether a careful site will notice. Re-check after changing the configuration.
Most often because it runs on a hosting address or sits in a published VPN range, because your browser's time zone and languages do not match the address, or because the address was used for abuse before you got it and is on a blocklist. The reasons list above says which one applies.
Using a VPN is legal in the United States. Some services restrict VPN use in their terms and may block known VPN ranges, and using a VPN does not make an otherwise illegal act legal. A handful of countries restrict or license VPN use; check local law when traveling.
To hide an address, to appear in another country, to get around a network block, to cache and filter traffic in an organization, to scrape or test websites from many addresses, or to share one connection among many users. Which of these a given proxy is doing is exactly what detection cannot tell — it only sees the address.
Lists: Tor Project exit list (hourly), X4BNet VPN and data center ranges (weekly), published ranges from AWS, Google, Oracle, DigitalOcean, Linode, Vultr, Cloudflare and Fastly, Apple iCloud Private Relay egress list, DNS blocklists with proxy return codes; network type from the ASN. Dates shown per check.