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Find out whether your connection — or any address — is a Tor exit node, using the Tor Project's own exit list refreshed every hour. Useful for confirming that Tor Browser is working and for understanding why a site treats an address differently.
The address websites see is compared with the Tor Project's bulk exit list, refreshed every hour.
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A real Tor Browser session matches all of them and the exit check above says Tor exit detected; matching a few is common in hardened Firefox profiles.
If this page says Tor exit detected, websites see you arriving from the Tor network; the exit's address, not yours, is shown at the top of the homepage. If it does not, your traffic is not leaving through a known exit — either Tor is not in use, or you are using a bridge or a private exit not in the public list.
The last relay in a Tor circuit, which makes the actual connection to the website. Its address is public by design, which is what lets sites — and this page — recognize Tor traffic.
Most of the roughly 7,000 Tor relays only pass encrypted traffic between other relays; only exits connect to the open internet. Being a relay operator does not make an address an exit, and relays that are not exits are not flagged here.
Enter an address to check it against the current exit list; the result shows when the list was last fetched. The list changes constantly as exits come and go, so an address that was an exit yesterday may not be one today.
Tor Browser builds a circuit through three volunteer-run relays. Your traffic is encrypted in layers, one per relay; each relay removes one layer and learns only the previous and next hop, so no single relay knows both who you are and where you are going. The exit relay sees the destination (and the content, unless it is HTTPS); the entry relay sees your address. Because exits are public, sites can block or challenge them, which is why Tor users see more captchas than VPN users.
The layered encryption scheme Tor is named for: the client wraps the message in three layers of encryption, and each relay peels one off — like an onion.
A network of volunteer relays and the Tor Browser that uses them, designed so that no single party can link who you are with what you visit. It is free software run by the non-profit Tor Project.
A technique in which a message is encrypted in several layers and passed through several relays, each of which can only remove its own layer and see the next hop. Tor uses three relays per circuit.
Your ISP can see that you connect to the Tor network (unless you use a bridge, which disguises the connection), but not what you do through it. Tor Browser itself is a normal download.
Tor is designed to resist tracking by any single party, including law enforcement. Known deanonymisations have relied on user mistakes, browser vulnerabilities, or controlling many relays at once — not on breaking the design. Tor is not perfect anonymity, and nothing is.
No. Tor is legal in the United States and most countries; some countries block or restrict it, and some websites block exit nodes on their own initiative.
Running or using an exit node is legal in most jurisdictions, though exit operators receive abuse complaints for traffic that passed through them and some have faced investigations. The Tor Project publishes guidance for operators.
Tor makes tracking very hard but not impossible: logging into accounts, enabling plugins, or being observed at both ends of a circuit by the same adversary can undo it. Use Tor Browser as shipped and do not log into anything tied to your identity.
Exit list: The Tor Project (check.torproject.org/torbulkexitlist), refreshed hourly by our lookup service; the fetch time is shown with every result. Browser hints are read locally and never sent.